This article synthesises the characteristics of social pensions across Asia and evaluates the effect of a new social pension in the Hong Kong SAR, the Old Age Living Allowance (OALA), on poverty alleviation, coverage rates and fiscal sustainability. We found that the effectiveness of the OALA in reducing old-age poverty was limited, although it has led to an increase of retirement pension coverage by 6%. The OALA is projected to face substantial cost increases in the medium and longer term. Increasing the level of OALA benefits would be a direct means to enhance its poverty alleviation effect but may potentially be hampered by concerns about the fiscal sustainability of such changes. More obfuscated alternatives for Hong Kong policy makers to affect old-age poverty alleviation include adjusting the indexing rules of benefit level payments and the eligibility criteria to reduce the stigma attached to the current policy choices.
Social pensions are non-contributory cash transfers paid to older-aged people on a regular basis. They have been shown to be an effective policy measure to reduce old-age poverty and pension coverage gaps, and thus to address the major shortcomings of contributory pension schemes in middle-income countries (Holzmann, Robalino, & Takayama, 2009 ), lowincome countries in Latin America (Barrientos et al., 2003; Bertranou & Grushka, 2002; Schwarzer & Querino, 2002) , in Africa (Gassmann & Behrendt, 2006; Kakwani & Subbarao, 2007) , as well as rich economies in the European Union (Figari, Matsaganis, & Sutherland, 2013) . At the same time, concerns about the fiscal sustainability of social pensions have led to controversial debates on the strengths and limitations of specific policy structures in the context of varying demographic profiles and political contexts (Commission on Poverty, 2015a Poverty, , 2017 Klugman et al., 2017) .
In 2013, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (henceforth: Hong Kong) put forth a new tax-funded, means-tested, noncontributory social pension, the so-called Old Age Living Allowance (OALA), for older people aged 65 and above. It thereby followed 22 other economies across Asia that had already introduced some form of social pension to provide social protection to their rapidly ageing populations (HelpAge International, 2017) . This article contributes to the growing literature on the economic well-being of older people (Smeeding, 2003; Smeeding & Sandstrom, 2005) by using secondary observational data from four rounds of the Hong Kong General Household Survey (GHS; Census and Statistics Department, 2017) in order to evaluate the effect of the OALA on old-age poverty rates, coverage rates and financial sustainability. Hong Kong is one of the fastest aging societies in the Asia-Pacific (United Nations, 2017) and our findings shed light on the specific policy levers by which policy makers could potentially respond to persistent old-age poverty, coverage gaps, as well as the fiscal and political concerns about the sustainability of their social pensions.
The article is structured as follows. First, we review the current trends of social pension development across Asia, its key structural characteristics and current fiscal costs to provide a broader context for studying the Hong Kong case. Second, we briefly outline the current retirement pension system in Hong Kong. Third, we investigate the poverty alleviation effects of the OALA, discuss its immediate impact on coverage rates in Hong Kong and present macroprojections on the future costs of the OALA alongside other zero pillar pension programmes in Hong Kong. Fourth, we discuss our main findings and suggest a series of policy-related findings to zero pillar pension outcomes in Hong Kong, before discussing some of the limitations of the chosen methods and available data sources. We conclude by suggesting potential avenues for further research.
Comparing social pensions across Asia
Social pensions are government-provided, tax-funded, non-contributory cash transfers that are regularly paid to older people during retirement. They are conceptualised as the zero pillar in the World Bank's framework of pension systems designed primarily to ensure absolute minimum living standards during retirement age (HelpAge International, 2017) . Three types of public zero pillar schemes are commonly distinguished. First, means-tested schemes aim to provide targeted benefits to poor pensioners, and entitlement to benefits depends on means tests. Second, universal basic pension schemes provide flat-rate benefits based on social citizenship criteria, although the calculation of benefits may still be based on previous years of work. Third, minimum pensions share many features with means-tested plans, but entitled benefit payments depend on pension income rather than income from savings or assets (OECD, 2015) .
Zero pillar pensions work alongside additional tiers and pillars of retirement systems. In the second tier, public-, employer-/social-, partner-sponsored or individual/household retirement plans aim to maintain previous living standards after retirement through earnings-related benefits following a contribution record. Defined-benefit (DB) plans can be provided by the state or by occupational schemes, and the level of benefits depends on the person's contribution record and individual earnings. In contrast, definedcontribution (DC) plans are either compulsory or voluntary, and the accumulated contribution and investment returns will convert into a pension income after retirement. Notional DC plans are positioned somewhere between DB and DC plans in the sense that the returns that individual contribution records earn are set by the government, for example by using a formula based on life expectancy, rather than on investment returns in the markets alone. Lastly, the third pillar is comprised of various insurance products and collective investment plans, typically in order to 'top up' retirement incomes. Investment saving plans provided by employers to high-skilled employees, or voluntary personal saving plans provided by financial institutions are the most common examples, while individual investment and saving plans, housing assets and family support also belong to this category.
New Zealand was the first country in the AsiaPacific region to introduce a social pension, in 1898, followed by Australia in 1900 (Palacios & Knox-Vydmanov, 2014) . Initially, the schemes in both countries were means-tested and featured comparatively low levels of benefits. In 1940, however, the social pension in New Zealand was made universal, whereas Australia witnessed a substantial increase in the benefit level during the 1930s (Lindert, 2004) . In the 1980s, Brunei and Malaysia introduced a social pension scheme, followed by another six countries (Bangladesh, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal and Thailand), representing a rapid expansion of social pensions in South Asia in the 1990s (Begum & Wesumperuma, 2012; ISSA, 2013; NEPAN, 2011) . The period between 2000 and 2011 represents another peak period in social pension provision, with eight additional East and South East Asian economies implementing this form of social protection for their older-aged populations (Taiwan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Maldives, the Philippines and Timor-Leste) (Suwanrada & Dharmapriya, 2012; UNHRC, 2010) .
Social pensions in Asia vary in terms of their broader policy goals. Social pension schemes in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Vietnam are antipoverty programmes, whereas schemes in South Korea and Thailand, similar to that of Hong Kong, primarily aim to address coverage gaps due to immature contributory programmes (Palacios, 2016) . In other cases, including Australia, New Zealand, the Maldives and Timor-Leste, social pensions present the main component of the retirement pension system. It is therefore not surprising that social pensions in Asia vary considerably regarding their benefit levels, targeting methods, eligibility criteria, coverage and fiscal costs (see Table 1 ).
The benefit levels of social pensions have remained quite low but vary between 34% in New Zealand and 1% of the national average per capita income in China. About half of the social pension schemes across Asia are universal, whereas the other half are means-tested. The age of eligibility varies from 55 for women in Mongolia to 77 in the Philippines. The coverage rate, measured as the percentage of people aged 60 or above receiving a social pension, ranges from 1 and 2% in Moldova and Vietnam, respectively, to 100% in Timor-Leste. The fiscal cost in relation to the size of the local economies is generally below 1%, with only Australia and New Zealand exceeding 2 and 3%, respectively.
In addition to demographic factors, such as projected birth rates and old-age dependency ratios, it is these structural features of social pensions thattogether with the depth of the local poverty gap, targeting efficiency and administrative costs -determine the fiscal sustainability of social pensions. Recent projections of the cost of social pensions across Asia have suggested that these will roughly double, to reach between 1.4 and 2.6% of GDP in South Asia and East Asia, respectively, during the period between 2010 and 2040 (Asher, 2012; Palacios & Sluchynsky, 2006) . At the lower end, for example in Thailand, the estimated fiscal cost of social pensions was suggested to increase from 0.59% in 2012 to 0.98% of GDP in 2040 (Jitsuchon, Skoufias, & Wiener, 2012) . At the higher end, for example in Australia, the estimated fiscal cost of the social pension was projected to rise to 3.9% of GDP by 2050 (Bateman & Piggott, 2011) . Given this wide range of structural characteristics and the ensuing fiscal sustainability of social pensions across Asia, the next section evaluates more specifically the effect of a newly implemented social pension in Hong Kong, the so-called OALA, on oldage poverty rates, coverage rates and financial sustainability. Before doing so, however, it is worthwhile to introduce readers to the particularities of the Hong Kong retirement pension system first.
The retirement pension system in Hong Kong
Hong Kong's social welfare system has been conceptualised as 'productivist', meaning social development is subordinated to the primary policy objective of achieving economic growth (Mok, K€ uhner, & Yeates, 2017) . Productivist welfare regimes feature relatively small redistributive and poverty alleviation effects of social protection programmes, although means-tested benefits tend to predominate (Chan, 2011; Holliday, 2000) . This 'paradox of redistribution' is commonly explained by the lower levels of fiscal investment into purely means-tested welfare programmes compared with those based on earningsrelated or universal principles (Korpi & Palme, 1998) . Welfare systems across Greater China and East Asia, with the exception of Japan, have commonly been characterised as 'welfare laggards' in regard to their public and mandatory private spending on protective welfare policies relative to their level of economic development (Hudson, K€ uhner, & Yang, 2014; K€ uhner, 2015) . Similarly, research on the retirement pension system in Hong Kong has emphasised that securing a sufficient retirement income is regarded primarily as a matter of individual responsibility, which is to be supported by family members when incomes fall short of meeting the needs of older people during retirement (Chou, Chi, & Chow, 2004) .
By the year 2000, the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme, which provides compulsory, privately managed, employment-based DC savings accounts, had become the major retirement income protection programme in Hong Kong. MPF members, and their employers on their behalf, contribute 5% of their salaries to their individual accounts. There are minimum (USD 910.3) and maximum (USD 3,846.2) monthly income levels and, for those whose incomes are below the minimum level, only employers contribute to the scheme. By the end of 2016, 73% of the 3.49 million Hong Kong labour force were covered under the MPF and MPF assets reached USD 82.9 billion (MPFA, 2016) . However, the replacement rate of MPF benefits for retirees with median salaries and after having contributed to the MPF scheme for 40 years reached merely 33%. The latest estimates suggest that it will take another 25 years for the MPF scheme to completely mature and provide fully actualised social protection to retirees in Hong Kong (MPFA, 2017) .
Particular concerns have been raised about the MPF's ability to provide adequate social protection for older-aged people with relatively low lifetime earnings and those with disrupted working careers, for example due to spells of childrearing and/or caretaking of older relatives. According to government figures, the old-age poverty rate in Hong Kong was 30.1% in 2014 after benefits and taxes (Commission on Poverty, 2015b), making it the third highest ranked among rich societies in this regard, behind only South Korea (50%) and Australia (34%) (OECD, 2015) . The old-age poverty rate in Hong Kong has been shown to be on an upward trajectory since the early 1990s, largely due to a significant decline in the number of earners in households with older-aged persons, which offset the poverty-reducing effect of higher education attainment of more recent cohorts of older Hong Kong people entering into retirement (Lee & Chou, 2016) .
Other research has underlined that the poverty risk in Hong Kong continues to be significantly higher for older persons than for younger age groups. In addition, older-aged people's acquired human capital (education and previous employment status), household composition (number of earners, children and older adults), place of birth (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan or Mainland China) and gender, among others, has affected the risk of falling into poverty during retirement to varying extent (Chan & Chou, 2016) . These worrying outcomes and trajectories have taken place despite a recurrent government expenditure on older-aged adults in Hong Kong (excluding public housing) of about HKD55.3 billion in the financial year 2014-2015, which was approximately 20% of the total government recurrent expenditure (Commission on Poverty, 2015a).
It is in light of these developments that the implementation of the OALA should be understood as an attempt by the Hong Kong government to narrow the pension coverage gap caused by the existing MPF scheme. However, the OALA is not the sole zero pillar pension programme in Hong Kong. In fact, the zero pillar consists of three programmes: the Old Age Category of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (Old Age CSSA) scheme, the OALA, and the Old Age Allowance (OAA) (Commission on Poverty, 2015a).
First, the Old Age CSSA is non-contributory, it is financed via tax revenues and is means-tested. The administrative procedure for applying for Old Age CSSA benefit payments has been characterised as being particularly strict, with all means tests being conducted on a household rather than individual basis. In 2015, the average monthly amount of Old Age CSSA received by an older person in Hong Kong was USD711.3, although benefit levels varied considerably between USD470.1 and USD1,341.3, depending on the health and other needs of the recipient. Second, all Hong Kong people aged 70 or over are eligible to apply for the OAA, which is a universal scheme and provides regular flat-rate benefits of USD158.3 each month. Third, the newly introduced OALA was designed to cater for persons aged 65 and above who are not eligible for the Old Age CSSA. The asset and income limits used for the OALA are less restrictive than those for the Old Age CSSA (e.g., financial support from family members is not regarded as income). However, its monthly benefits in 2015 were considerably lower even than the lower bound of Old Age CSSA payments, but higher than the flat-rate OAA payments (USD306.4).
Before the implementation of the OALA, there were two schemes under the OAA 2 the so-called 'Normal OAA' and the 'Higher OAA'. In 2012, the Normal OAA offered monthly payments of USD139.7 to older people aged between 65 and 69, was means-tested and used the same criteria for the assets and income tests as the current OALA. The Higher OAA offered flat-rate benefit payments of USD139.7 to those aged 70 or older on a universal basis. The Old Age CSSA was intended to provide aid in the form of residual assistance under circumstances in which both individuals and their families failed to provide a sufficient retirement income. However, due to the strict application process and the income and asset thresholds in its means tests, the Old Age CSSA scheme has led to considerable stigma leading to 43% of eligible old-aged adults failing to apply (Oxfam, 2010) . Although the High OAA (HOAA) was universal in nature, its benefits were too minimal to provide sufficient social protection to many Hong Kong retirees.
In the remainder of this article, we examine the OALA, alongside the Old Age CSSA and OAA, in terms of its effect on poverty alleviation, coverage rates and fiscal sustainability. We do so by: (i) identifying the median monthly household income before and after the implementation of the OALA; (ii) examining old-age poverty rates before and after the implementation of the OALA; (iii) evaluating the effect of the OALA on pension coverage; and (iv) examining the financial sustainability of the OALA scheme for the coming 50 years.
Investigating the effect of the OALA in Hong Kong

Data sources
Our empirical data were taken from the Hong Kong GHS, which is conducted every four months and adopts the sampling frame of quarters maintained by the Department of Census and Statistics. That is, records were first stratified by geographical area and type of quarters, and then quarters were drawn to form replicates using systematic replicate sampling. Based on this rotational replicate sample design, about half of the sampled quarters in each month were enumerated and interviewed by telephone, while the other half were newly selected and interviewed face-to-face.
To increase the sample size for our empirical analysis, we used four rounds of data collection before and after implementation of the OALA. The rounds of the survey examined in this article were from: (i) the second quarter of 2012 to the first quarter of 2013 and (ii) from the first quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2014. The number of sampled households was approximately 20,000 for each round of surveys. The full sample consisted of 79,246 households before and 77,751 households after the implementation of the OALA. Administrative data from the Department of Social Welfare were extracted to estimate the coverage of the OALA, CSSA and OAA, while the fiscal sustainability of the OALA was projected using a macro-simulation model based on projected older-aged populations, take-up rates and total GDP in the coming 50 years, as proposed by the Working Group on Long-Term Fiscal Planning Report of the Hong Kong government (Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, 2016).
Median monthly household income and old-age poverty rates
Data from the time period before and after the implementation of the OALA were used to examine the effect of the OALA on the household incomes and Introducing a social pension in Hong Kong poverty rates of domestic households in Hong Kong, including their older members. The monthly household income was computed as the sum of cash incomes received collectively by all household members. We adopted two different methods of equalisation of household incomes. First, we computed the poverty threshold as half of the median of household income adjusted by household size with the square root rule, which divides household income by the square root of household size, in order to facilitate international comparison of our findings. Second, given that the Hong Kong government computes poverty thresholds by adjusting incomes for households with different sizes (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 61 persons in the household), we also adopted this alternative method.
As the median of the household income changed after the implementation of the OALA, we calculated two separate poverty thresholds (i.e., before and after the implementation of the OALA). The old-age poverty rate before and after the implementation of the OALA was defined as the number of older-aged persons who were living in households with incomes below the various poverty thresholds, respectively, and expressed as a share of the total number of older adults in the samples (65 years of age and above). The number of older adults in the Hong Kong population before and after the implementation of the OALA was 917,006 and 994,624, respectively, because sample weights were attached to each household to align the sample with characteristics of the whole population in the reference year.
The median monthly household income adjusted by household size with the square root rule increased from HKD12,500 to HKD13,750 after the implementation of the OALA. The old-age poverty rate decreased from 36.2 before to 31.57% after the implementation of the OALA when we used the same poverty thresholds based on equivalised household income before the implementation of the OALA (Table 3) . However, when using the poverty thresholds generated after the implementation of the OALA (i.e., using the adjusted median household incomes), the old-age poverty rate changed only slightly, to 36.77%. Our findings were similar when using the poverty thresholds preferred by the Hong Kong government. Even though the income of some individual households increased due to receiving OALA, the combined effect led to an overall increase in the median household income only for some, namely 1, 3 and 4, but not all household sizes; the amount of change in the median household income thereby varied for each of the three household sizes ( Table 2 ). The old-age poverty rate decreased from 32.47 to 27.14% when we used the poverty thresholds based on equivalised household incomes before the implementation of the OALA. When we used the adjusted poverty thresholds from after the implementation of the OALA, the old-age poverty rate decreased only slightly, to 30.67% (see Table 3 ).
Coverage of the OALA
In addition to changes in old-age poverty rates, we computed coverage rates of the Old Age CSSA, the Normal OAA and the Higher OAA before the implementation of the OALA, and then compared them with the coverage of the OALA, OAA and Old Age CSSA after the implementation of the OALA (Table 4) . In 2012, before the launch of the OALA, the coverage rate of the Old Age CSSA, Normal OAA and Higher OAA was 13, 6 and 32% of older Hong Kong people aged 60 and above, respectively. Collectively, just over half of all older-aged adults in Hong Kong received payments through one of the three schemes (51%). After the implementation of the OALA in 2014, the collective coverage rate increased from 51 to 57%: the coverage rate of the Old Age CSSA, OALA and OAA was 11, 27 and 29% of all adults aged 60 and above, respectively. This increase in the collective coverage rate of 6% may be due to some older people in Hong Kong who did not receive any zero pillar pension benefits before the implementation of the OALA, subsequently applying for it. We also found a reduction in the coverage rate of the Old Age CSSA, which may be due to some of its recipients shifting to the OALA, possibly due to the fact that the stigma attached to the OALA is not as strong as that of the Old Age CSSA. We accept that our interpretation has to remain speculative at this point, but suggest that further research into shifting coverage trends before and after the implementation of the OALA promises to yield important additional nuance to our understanding of public attitudes towards zero pillar pensions with different structural characteristics.
Sustainability of the OALA
Lastly, we present the projected expenditure trends of the OALA, OAA and Old Age CSSA in the period between 2015 and 2064 using a macro-simulation on the basis of the 2015 payment levels and prices (Table 5) . We also adopt the projected GDP under the framework of the Fiscal Planning Report (i.e., 3.5% for 2014-2021; 3.0% for 2022-2025; 2.5% for 2026-2041; and 2.0% for 2042-2064), and derive trends in the older-aged population in Hong Kong from the latest government projections (Census and Statistics Department, 2015). All take-up rates for the OALA, OAA and Old Age CSSA were taken from the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (2016), as discussed above. Following its downward trend, the Old Age CSSA take-up rate was anticipated to decrease gradually to 6.1% in 2064. Because it was implemented in 2013, there was no trend to follow for the OALA and we assumed that its takeup rate would remain at the current level (i.e., 34% for those aged between 65 and 69 years and 40% for those aged 70 years or older for the whole projection period). According to the latest Fiscal Planning Report, a constant take-up of 29% was assumed for the OAA in the coming 50 years. According to our projections, the expenditure of the Old Age CSSA, OAA and the OALA collectively is expected to increase from 2.8 billion USD in 2015 to 11.9 billion USD in 2064. This is an increase from 0.96% of GDP in 2015 to 1.23% of GDP in 2064. The relative share of the Old Age CSSA is thereby projected to decline from just over 58% in 2015 to merely 37% in 2064. By contrast, it is the OALA (from 27 to 33%), and particularly the OAA (from 15 to 30%), that will grow in relative importance. In the final section of this article, we summarise and discuss our key findings in more detail.
Conclusion and discussion
Social pension payments that are too low may struggle to reduce old-age poverty adequately but ensure it remains financially sustainable. A balance must be struck in order to maximise both the poverty alleviation effect and the fiscal sustainability of social pensions. This is true in Hong Kong as much as it is elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. Due to the complexity of related issues, however, there is no one-size-fits-all reform model of retirement pensions that can be easily applied in all contexts. In Hong Kong, the implementation of the OALA was explicitly designed to address the coverage gap created by the Hong Kong MPF scheme. Despite increasing retirement pension coverage by 6%, our findings suggest that the effectiveness of the OALA in reducing old-age poverty has been limited. The poverty alleviating effect of the OALA thereby varies considerably depending on the household equalisation rule being applied. We have also shown that the poverty alleviation effect of the OALA is greater when poverty thresholds before the implementation of the OALA are used, whereas it is negligible for those after (due to changes in the equivalised median household incomes post intervention). The effect of Old Age CSSA on poverty alleviation is greater than the effect of the OALA, given that the application procedures and eligibility criteria for the former are much stricter than for the latter: In 2015, the CSSA reduced the poor population by some 0.2 million, leading to reductions in the overall poverty rate in Hong Kong by 2.8% (Commission on Poverty, 2016). Our analysis suggests that among the 420,227 OALA recipients in the sample, 28.2% (n 5 118,400), were still classified as living in poverty despite receiving benefit payments through this scheme. OALA benefits (USD282.1 in 2014) amounted to only about two-thirds of the poverty threshold for a oneperson household (USD448.7) in 2014 (Commission on Poverty, 2015b).
At first glance, this suggests that the most effective way to increase the poverty alleviating effect of the OALA would be to increase its level of benefits. However, while doing so might or might not further boost the take-up rate (Cantillon, Van Mechelen, & Schulte, 2008) , it might also pose additional pressures on the scheme's fiscal sustainability, as the OALA is already projected to face substantial costs increases at the current level of benefits. In the long run, the poverty alleviation effect of OALA benefits will automatically be diminished as they are currently pegged against consumer prices instead of wage growth. In the past two decades, the median wage in Hong Kong increased by 50%, whereas the consumer price index increased by merely 25% (Census and Statistics Department, 2003 , 2016a , 2016b ). Given the already low level of OALA benefits, this poses a considerable barrier to effective old-age poverty alleviation in Hong Kong and policy makers should seriously consider tagging future increases of OALA benefits and other cash welfare payments with wages instead of consumer prices. Hong Kong policy makers should not allow the benefits of these zero pillar pensions to devalue over time due to indexation below wage growth. Failure to reconsider existing indexation rules and reduce the stigma attached to the current retirement policies in Hong Kong could lead to persisting high levels of old-age poverty becoming further aggravated.
The World Bank recommended that social pensions such as the OALA should be relatively 'small' and 'simple' so as to satisfy basic fiscal sustainability criteria (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005) . Policy researchers and non-governmental organisations have advocated universal pensions that are easier to administer than means-tested structures and could provide minimum income guarantees for all older people (Grosh, 2015) , echoing long-standing theoretical debates on the merits of means-tested versus universal policy mechanisms in other social policy areas (Marshall, 1950;  Note:
a Amount in USD ('000,000) -exchange rate: 1 USD 5 7.8 HKD.
b As a percentage of GDP. The projection of GDP and the take-up rates of the CSSA, OALA, and OAA were adopted under the framework of the 'Report of the Working Group on Long-Term Fiscal Planning'. Tawney, 1952) . Both OALA and OAA are perceived by the Hong Kong public as rights-based instruments, although the former is offered on the basis of assessed needs and grounded in selectivity (Chow, 2015) . Our findings suggest that it is the universal OAA, and not the OALA, which will grow most in relative terms among the zero pillar pensions in Hong Kong; the relative importance of the 'strict' Old Age CSSA is bound to further diminish. This 'strengthening' of the only universal component of the zero pillar pensions in Hong Kong goes against the 'productivist' principles inherent in the Hong Kong social model. Whether re-allocating the financial resources from the means-tested Old Age CSSA and OALA to the OAA scheme is politically feasibleeven in the context of the budget surpluses that the Hong Kong government continually achieves -is a question that cannot be sufficiently answered in this article.
Having said this, poverty alleviation, coverage and fiscal sustainability are not necessarily conflicting objectives, but rather two sides of the same coin (Grech, 2010) . If a retirement pension system falls short in regard to basic adequacy criteria set by policy makers and the public, there could be strong political pressure for higher government expenditure on other welfare policies to support the needs of a growing older-aged population (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005) . There has already been a shift towards considering how retirement pension provision might be suitably combined with more 'investive' welfare policies over people's life course to support active ageing and more progressive adult worker models across Asia (Estevez-Abe, Yang, & Choi, 2016) . What is more, experts have long acknowledged that the fiscal sustainability of social pensions, not unlike any other welfare policies, depends on political support for contributions or tax revenues sufficient to pay for regular benefits and on whether or not timely adjustments are politically feasible (Barr, 2013) . In other words, governments have at their disposal policy measures to assist older-aged people in raising their incomes through the provision of adequate social protection during retirement. However, in reality there is no guarantee that the local politics of social welfare will enable them to implement and sustain such policies.
In conclusion, we hope that this article will be perceived as a further contribution to the on-going debate on pension reforms around the world. At the same time, our analysis has certain limitations, largely due to the empirical sources at our disposal. There is therefore no shortage of opportunities to add to the discussions presented in this article. For instance, we did not consider the effect of taxes on the calculation of household income because such data were not available to us. The effect of this may be minimal for the estimation of the old-age poverty rate in Hong Kong because only 20% of workers actually pay income tax due to the city's high exemption rule, but any attempt to conduct similar analyses for other Asian cases will have to be more cautious in this regard. We chose an income-based poverty definition, yet it is well known that household income is a sensitive form of data that may be subject to bias due to under-reporting. For instance, we did not take expenditure, assets and living standards into account in the measurement of poverty.
We cannot claim a causal link between the implementation of the OALA and the reduction in the oldage poverty rate without using a difference-indifference or double-difference estimator, in order to mimic an experimental research design, by studying the differential effect of a treatment on a 'treatment group' versus a 'control group'. Readers should be mindful of the fact that the highlighted changes in the old-age poverty and coverage rates between 2012 and 2014 could also have been caused by other factors, such as economic growth, changing employment rates and wage increases. Not least, there are some errors that are very difficult to measure in GHSs. Older people who have monthly incomes or assets near the eligibility limit may deliberately reduce their incomes or assets in order to become eligible for the OALA. Furthermore, a post-intervention period of just one year was examined, but the longer-term effects of the implementation of the OALA still remain unknown.
Further work needs to be done to consider how to improve social pensions in Hong Kong and elsewhere across Asia, so that further old-age poverty may potentially be averted and brought closer to the levels experienced among some of the international leaders in this regard (OECD, 2015) . After six months of public consultation, the Hong Kong government proposed an increase in benefits, to USD 440.4, for OALA recipients with few assets (i.e., singles with less than USD 18,461.5 and older couples with less than USD 17,948.7) by adding a higher tier of assistance and relaxing the existing asset limits for the original OALA scheme in 2017 (Commission on Poverty, 2017). While certainly a positive sign, preventing older people from falling into poverty is a challenge for Hong Kong policy makers that is only going to become more challenging in the coming decades because of the rising inequality in the labour force, persistently low fertility rates, and everincreasing longevity.
